

**A letter addressed to
Hippolytus A Collibus, Ambassador
from the most illustrious Prince,
The elector Palatine, Frederick IV,
To the Seven United Dutch Provinces:
Likewise, Certain Articles To be
subjected to a diligent examination,
because some controversy has arisen about
them among
the Professors of the reformed Religion:
In Which Arminius more fully declares
his sentiments on the principal Articles of
Christian Doctrine.**

By the Rev. James Arminius, D.D.
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An Eminent Professor Of Sacred Theology

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Introduction

BENEVOLENT READER,

It cannot be a matter of secrecy to you, how various, uncertain and prodigious the rumors are which have been circulated through Holland, Germany, and Great Britain, concerning JAMES ARMINIUS, Professor of Divinity; and in what manner (I do not stop to discuss with how much zeal) some persons accuse this man of schism and others of heresy, some charge him with the crime of Pelagianism and others brand him with the black mark of Socinianism, while all of them execrate him as the pest of the reformed churches. On this account, those persons who feel a regard for the memory of this learned man, and who, not without good reason, are desirous of maintaining his reputation and character, and of defending him from those atrocious imputations and virulent calumnies, have lately published some of his erudite lucubrations, which are polished with the greatest care. They have thus placed them within the reach of the public, that the reader, who is eager in the pursuit after truth, may more easily and happily form his judgment about the station which Arminius is entitled to hold among posterity, not from fallacious rumors and the criminations of the malevolent, but from authentic documents, as if from the ingenuous confession itself of the accused speaking openly in his own cause, and mildly replying to the crimes with which he has been charged.

With this object in view, the friends of Arminius have published, as separate treatises, his MODEST EXAMINATION *of a Pamphlet, written some years ago by that very learned Divine, WILLIAM PERKINS, on Predestination: To which is added, an ANALYSIS of the Ninth Chapter of the Epistle to the Romans*, and his DISSERTATION *on the true and genuine Meaning of the Seventh Chapter of the Epistle to the Romans*.

But these two works are neither sufficient nor satisfactory to many dispositions that are [*curiosis*] prying or [*sagacibus*] that indulge in surmises, and to other eminent men who abound with an acrimonious shrewdness of judgment; because they embrace neither the whole nor the chief [*aporias*] of the perplexing difficulties of James Arminius. Some of those who attended his Academical Lectures, affirm that he frequently uttered novel and astounding paradoxes about other points of the orthodox doctrine [than are contained in the two Works just mentioned]. Other persons relate, as a great secret, that Arminius addressed 'A LETTER' to Hippolytus a Collibus, in which he more fully discloses his own pestiferous sentiments; and that 'CERTAIN ARTICLES' are circulated in a private manner, in which, while treating upon several of the chief heads of orthodox Theology, he introduces his own poisonous dogmas.

In this state of affairs, we may be permitted to give some assistance to an absent person, nay, to one who is dead, and to offer a reply to the accusations and criminations which we have now specified, by the evidence of witnesses who are worthy of credit, and by the publication of the very documents which we are thus challenged to produce. Perhaps, by this means, we shall be able to remove those sinister insinuations and suspicions. We shall, at least, meet the wishes of a number of persons, and shall terminate the anxieties of several minds that have till now been in a state of suspense.

Introduction

Accept, therefore, candid Reader, of that ‘LETTER’ about which so many reports have been circulated, and which was addressed to *Hippolytus a Collibus, Ambassador from Prince Frederick IV, the Elector Palatine*.

Accept, likewise, of those ‘ARTICLES’ which are to be diligently examined and pondered, and which give us the sentiments of Arminius *on the One and the Triune GOD, The Attributes of GOD, the Deity of the SON, Predestination and Divine Providence, Original Sin, Free Will, the Grace of GOD, CHRIST and his Satisfaction, Justification, Faith and Repentance, Regeneration, the Baptism of Infants, the Lords Supper, and On Magistracy*. Accurately consider and candidly judge whatever he thought necessary to be amended or to be rendered more complete in the doctrine of the reformed churches.

The writing of this man require no commendations from me, or from any other person: There is no need of ivy in this instance, for [*merx*] these productions will ensure approbation.¹

¹I have translated this ‘ADDRESS TO THE READER’ from a scarce 8vo copy, printed at Delft in 1613, by ‘JOHN ANDREWS, *at the sign of the Golden Alphabet*.’ This is the only edition of the pamphlet that affords us any thing in the form of an INTRODUCTION to the important observations which it contains.

1 A letter, by the Rev. James Arminius, D.D.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, THE NOBLE LORD, HIPPOLYTUS A COLLIBUS, AMBASSADOR, FROM THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS PRINCE, THE ELECTOR PALATINE, TO THE SEVEN UNITED DUTCH PROVINCES, JAMES ARMINIUS WISHETH HEALTH AND SUCCESS.

MOST HONOURABLE SIR:

When I was lately admitted to a conversation with you, you had the kindness to intimate to me the reports which you understood had been circulated at Heidelberg about my *heterodoxy* in certain Articles of our faith; and you gave me this information, not only that you might yourself hear from me personally the whole truth about the matter, but, much more, that, by the intervention of your good offices, the suspicions concerning me, which have been so unhandsomely conceived and propagated, might be removed from the minds of other persons, since this is a course which Truth requires. I endeavoured at that interview, with diligence and seriousness to comply with your obliging request, and by returning a frank and open reply to each of those questions which your Excellency proposed, I instantly disclosed my sentiments about those several Articles. For, in addition to my being bound to do this, by my duty as a Christian man, and especially as a divine, such a course of conduct was demanded from me by the great candour, condescension and benevolence which you exhibited towards me.

But my explanation was so agreeable to your Excellency (which I ascribe to an act of the Divine Benignity towards me), as to induce you, on that occasion, to think it requisite that those propositions of mine should be committed to writing and transmitted to you, not only for the purpose of being thus enabled the more certainly and firmly to form your own judgment about the matter when you had maturely reflected upon it, but also with the design of communicating my written answers to others, that they might confute the calumny and vindicate my innocence. Having followed the counsel of your prudence, and firmly relying on the same hope, I now accede to your further wishes, in this letter; and I intreat your Excellency to have the goodness to peruse its contents with the same candour and equanimity as were displayed when you listened to their delivery. Unless my mind greatly deceives me, your Excellency will find in this letter that which will not only be able to obliterate, but also completely to eradicate, every unjust suspicion concerning me, from the minds of those good men who know that every one is the best interpreter of his own sentiments, and that the utmost credit is to be given to him who sacredly, and in the presence of God, bears testimony to his own meaning.

The Articles of Doctrine about which your Excellency made inquiries, were, as far as my memory serves me, the following: *the Divinity of the Son of God, Providence, Divine Predestination, Grace and Free Will, and Justification*. Beside these, you inquired about the things which concerned our opinions, in answer to the interrogatories of the States of Holland, concerning the mode of holding the proposed Synod. But as the latter relate to that most eminent man, the Rev. John Uytenbogard, minister of the Church at the

Hague, as much as to me, I leave them to be explained by him, whose residence is much nearer to that of your excellency.

With regard to all these Doctrinal Articles, I confidently declare that I have never taught anything, either in the Church or in the University, which contravenes *the Sacred Writings*, that ought to be with us the sole rule of thinking and of speaking, or which is opposed to *the Dutch Confession of Faith*, or to *the Heidelberg Catechism*, that are our stricter formularies of consent. In proof of this assertion I might produce, as most clear and unquestionable testimonies, the Theses which I have composed on these several Articles, and which have been discussed as Public Disputations in the university; but as those Theses are not entirely in readiness for every one, and can be with difficulty transmitted, I will now treat upon each of them specially, as far as I shall conceive it necessary.

1.1 The Divinity of the Son of God

Concerning the Divinity of the Son of God, I have taught, and still teach,

- that the Father has never been without his Word and his Spirit,
- but that the Word and the Spirit are not to be considered in the Father under the notion of properties, as Wisdom, Goodness, Justice, or Power, but under that of really existing persons, to whom it belongs *to be, to live, to understand, to will, to be capable, and to do or act*, all of which, when united, are indications and proofs of a person,
- but that they are so *in* the Father as to be also *from* the Father, in a certain order of origin, not through collaterality, to be referred to the Father,
- and that they are from the Father neither by *creation* nor by *decision* but by a most wonderful and inexplicable *internal emanation*, which, with respect to the Son, the Ancient Church called *generation*, but with respect to the Holy Spirit, was denominated *spiration* or *breathing*, a term required by the very [etymon of the] word SPIRIT.

But about this breathing, I do not interpose my judgment

- whether it is *from the Father and the Son*, as the Latin Fathers express themselves,
- or *from the Father through the Son*, as the Greek Fathers prefer to define it,

because this matter, I confess, far surpasses my capacity. If, on any subject, we ought to think and speak with sobriety, in my opinion, it must be on this.

Since these are my sentiments on the Divinity of the Son of God, no reason could exist why, on this point, I should endure the shafts of calumny. Yet this slander was first fabricated and spread through the whole of Germany by one in whom such conduct was exceedingly indecorous; because he was my pupil, and ought to have refrained from that course, having been taught by his own painful experience that he either possessed an unhappy memory, or was of doubtful credit; for he had previously been convicted of a similar calumny, and had openly confessed his fault before me, and requested my

forgiveness. But, as I learned from a certain manuscript which was transmitted to Leyden out of Germany, and which the same youth had delivered to the Heidelberg divines, he took the groundwork of his calumny from those things which I had publicly taught concerning the economy of our salvation, as administered by the Father through the Son and the Holy Spirit. In the explanation of this economy, I had said

that we must have a diligent regard to this order, which the Scriptures in every part most religiously observe; and that we must distinctly consider what things are attributed as peculiar to the Father in this matter, what to the Son, and what to the Holy Spirit.

After this, some other persons seized upon a different occasion for the same calumny, from my having said that the Son of God was not correctly called *Αυτοθεον* ‘Ωery God,’ in the same sense in which that word signifies ‘God from himself.’

This audacious inclination for calumniating was promoted by the circumstance of my having explained in a different manner, certain passages of the Old and New Testament, which have been usually adduced to establish the Consubstantiality or the coessentiality of the Trinity. But I can with ease in a moment shew, from the books of the Old and New Testament themselves, from the whole of Antiquity, and from the sentiments of the Ancient Church, both Greek and Latin, as well as from the testimony of our own divines, that nothing can be deduced from those alleged misinterpreted passages, which is with the least semblance of probability, adverse to the sound and orthodox faith. In his able defense of Calvin, against the treatise of Hunnius, entitled ‘CALVIN JUDAIZING,’ the learned Paraeus has taught that this last occasion was seized upon in vain; and he has liberated me from the necessity of this service.

To spend any time in confuting the First Slander, which was circulated by the young student, would not repay my trouble. Those who know that the Father in the Son hath reconciled the world unto himself, and administers the word of reconciliation through the Spirit, know, likewise, that, in the dispensation of salvation, an order must be considered among the persons of the Trinity, and their attributes must not be confounded, unless they be desirous of falling into the heresy of the Patripassionists.

Respecting the Second Occasion, which concerns the word *Αυτοθεον* ‘very God,’ an answer somewhat more laboured must be undertaken, because there are not a few persons who are of a contrary opinion, and yet our Church does not consider such persons as holding wrong sentiments concerning the Trinity. This is the manner in which they propound their doctrine.

Because the essence of the Father and of the Son is one, and because it has its origin from no one, therefore, in this respect, the Son is correctly denominated *Αυτοθεον* that is, *God from himself*.

But I reply, ‘The essence of the Son is from no one, or is from himself,’ is not the same as ‘the Son is from himself, or from no one.’ For, to speak in a proper and formal manner, the Son is not an essence, but having his essence by a certain mode *Υπαρχεως* of being or existence.

They rejoin

The Son may be considered in two respects, ‘as He is the Son, and as He is God. *As He is the Son*, He is from the Father, and has his essence from the Father. But *as He is God*, He has his essence from himself or from no one.

But the latter of these expressions is the most correct; for *to have his essence from himself* implies a contradiction.

I reply, I admit this distinction; but it is extended much further than is allowable. For *as He is God*, He has the divine essence. *As He is the Son*, He has it from the Father. That is, by the word ‘God,’ is signified, generally, that which has the Divine Essence without any certain mode of subsistence. But, by the word ‘the Son,’ is signified a certain mode of having the Divine Essence, which is through communication from the Father, that is, through generation.

Let these double ternaries be taken into consideration, which are opposed to each other, in one series,

To have deity: To have Deity from the Father: To have Deity from no one:

TO BE GOD: TO BE THE SON: TO BE THE FATHER:

and it will be evident, that among themselves they mutually correspond with each other, thus:

- ‘to have Deity,’ and ‘to be God’
- ‘to have Deity from the Father,’ and ‘to be the Son’
- ‘to have Deity from no one,’ and ‘to be the Father’

are consentaneous, though under the word ‘Father,’ as an affirmative, that is not signified which has its essence from no one; for this is signified by the word ‘*Ingenitus*,’ inwardly born, which is attributed to the Father, though not with strictness, but only to signify that the Father has not his essence by the mode of generation. But the word ‘FATHER’ by its own force and meaning is conclusive on this point: For where order is established, it is necessary that a beginning be made from some first person or thing, otherwise there will be confusion proceeding onwards *ad infinitum*. But, with respect to origin, He who is the First in this order has his origin from no one; He who is the Second, has his origin from the First; He who is the Third has his origin from the First and the Second, or from the First through the Second. Were not this the real state of the matter; there would be a COLLATERALITY, which would make as many Gods as there were collateral persons laid down; since *the Unity of the Deity in the Trinity* is defended against the Anti-trinitarians solely by the relation of origin and of order according to origin.

But that it may evidently appear what were the sentiments of Antiquity about this matter, I will here adduce from the Ancient Fathers, both of the Greek and Latin Church, some passages which are applicable to this subject.

BASIL THE GREAT

According to the habit of causes to those things which are from them, we say that the Father has precedence before the Son (*Ever. lib. 1*)

Because the Son has his [*principium*] source from the Father. According to this, the Father is the greater, as the cause and the source. Wherefore our Lord also has said, ‘My Father is greater than I,’ that is, because He is the Father. But what other signification can the word ‘FATHER’ have, than *the cause* and *the beginning* of Him who is begotten from Him? (*ibid.*).

The Father is the root and the fountain of the Son and of the Holy Spirit (*Discourse against the Sabellians and Arius*).

When I have said ‘one essence,’ I do not understand two [persons] distinguished from one, but the Son subsisting from [*principio*] the source of the Father, not the Father and Son from one superior essence. For we do not call them ‘brothers,’ but we confess them to be ‘the FATHER and the SON.’ But essence is identity, because the Son is from the Father, not made by command, but begotten from nature; not divided from the Father, but [*manente perfecto, perfecte reducens*] while He remains perfect, reflecting perfectly back again the light. But that you may not be able to charge these our assertions against us as a crime, and lest you should say, ‘He preaches two gods; he announces a multitude of deities;’ there are not two gods, neither are there two fathers. He who produces two [*principia*] original sources, preaches two gods (*ibid.*).

The way of the knowledge of God is, by one Spirit, through one Son, to one Father. And, on the contrary, natural goodness, natural sanctification, and royal dignity [*transit*] are transmitted from the Father, through the only begotten Son, to the Spirit. Thus we confess the Persons [in the Godhead] and at the same time the pious doctrine [*Monarchie*] of the Unity is not undermined (*On the Holy Spirit*, cap. 18).

GREGORY NAZIANZEN

The [*esse*] essence is common and equal to the Son with the Father, though the Son has it from the Father (*Fourth Discourse on Theology*).

How is it possible for the same thing to be *greater* than itself and yet *equal* to itself? Is it not, therefore, plain, that the word ‘greater,’ which is attributed to the Father in reference to the Son, must be referred to CAUSE; but the word ‘equal,’ which is attributed to the Son, as to his equality with the Father, must be referred to NATURE? (*ibid.*).

It may indeed be *truly* said, but not therefore so honourably, that, ‘with regard to the Humanity, the Father is greater than the Son:’ For what is there wonderful in God being greater than man? (*ibid.*).

AMBROSE

Though Christ has redeemed us, yet ‘all things are of God,’ because from him is all the Paternity. It is, therefore, of necessity that the person of the Father [*praeferri*] have the precedence (*On 2 Corinthians* v. 18).

Consult also his remarks *On 1 Corinthians* 15.

AUGUSTINE

If that which begets is [*principium*] the original source of that which is begotten, the Father is the source of the Son, because He begets Him (*On the Trinity*, lib. 5, cap. 14).

He did not say ‘whom the Father will send from me,’ as He said, ‘whom I will send from the Father,’ that is, plainly shewing the Father to be the source of the entire Deity (*ibid.* lib. 4, cap. 10).

Therefore this was said concerning the Father: ‘He doeth the works;’ because from Him also is the origin of the works, from whom the cooperating Persons [in the Deity] have their existence: For both the Son is born of Him, and the Holy Spirit principally proceeds from Him, from whom the Son is born, and with whom the same Spirit is common [*illi*] with the Son (*idem*, tom. 10, fol. 11, col. 1).

Indeed God the Father is not God from another God; but God the Son is God from God the Father. But the Son is as much from the Father, as the Father is from no one (*Against Maximinus*, lib. 3, cap. 23, col. 2).

HILARY

There is no God who is eternal and without beginning, and who is God to that God from whom are all things. But the Father is God to the Son; for from Him He was born God (lib. 4, fol. 60).

The confession of the true faith is, God is so born of God, as light is from light, which, without detriment to itself, offers its own nature from itself, that it may bestow that which it has, and that it may have what it bestows, etc. (lib. 6, fol. 87).

It is apparent from these passages, according to the sentiments of the Ancient Church, that the Son, even as He is God, is from the Father, because He has received his Deity, according to which He is called [*Deus*] ‘God,’ by being born of the Father; though the name of God does not indicate this mode of being or existence. From these quotations, it is also evident that, because the Father is [*principium*] the source of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, he is called [*principium*] the source of the whole Deity; not indeed because God has any beginning or source, but because [*illa*] the Deity is communicated by the Father to the Son and the Holy Spirit. So far, therefore, is this from being a correct expression:

The Son of God *as he is God*, is from no one; and, with respect to his essence, is from himself or from no one.

For He who has received his essence by being born of the Father, is from the Father with respect to his essence.

I consider, therefore, that those who desire to think and to speak with Orthodox Antiquity, ought to abstain from these methods of expression; because, by adopting them, they seem to become the patrons of the opposing heresies of the Tritheists, and the Sabelians. Peruse the preface to the *Dialogues of St Athanasius On the Trinity*, by Theodore Beza; who excuses Calvin by saying, that he did not so solicitously observe the difference between the two phrases — ‘He is the Son *per se*, through himself,’ and ‘He is the Son *a se*, from himself.’

If any one be desirous of knowing from me anything further on this point, I will not refuse to hold a placid conference with him either in writing or by conversation. I now proceed to the other topics, in the discussion of which I will consult brevity.

1.2 The providence of God

My sentiments respecting the providence of God are these: It is present with, and presides over, all things; and all things, according to their essences, quantities, qualities, relations, actions, passions, places, times, stations and habits, are subject to its governance, conservation, and direction. I except neither particular, sublunary, vile, nor contingent things, not even the free wills of men or of angels, either good or evil: And, what is still more, I do not take away from the government of the Divine Providence even sins themselves, whether we take into our consideration their Commencement, their Progress, or their Termination.

1. With respect to the BEGINNING of Sin, I attribute the following acts to the providence of God:

FIRST. Permission, and that not idle, but which has united in it four positive acts:

- a) The Preservation of the creature according to essence, life and capability.
- b) Care lest a greater or an equal power be placed in opposition.
- c) The Offering of an object against which sin will be committed.
- d) The destined Concession of its Concurrence, which, on account of the dependence of a Second on the First Cause, is a necessary Concurrence.

SECONDLY. The Administration of arguments and occasions, soliciting to the perpetration of sin.

THIRDLY. The Determination of place, time, manner, and of similar circumstances.

FOURTHLY. The immediate Concurrence itself of God with the act of sin.

2. With respect to the PROGRESS of sin, I attribute also the following four acts to the Divine Government:

The FIRST is the Direction of sin that is already begun, to a certain object, at which the offending creature either has not aimed, or has not absolutely aimed.

The SECOND act is the Direction of sin to the end which God himself wills, whether the creature intend or do not intend that end, nay, though he intend another and quite opposite end.

The THIRD act is the Prescribing and Determination of the time during which He wills or permits sin to endure.

The FOURTH act is the Refining of its magnitude, by which [*modus*] limits are placed on sin, that it may not increase and assume greater strength.

The whole of these acts, both concerning the Commencement and the Progress of sin, I consider distinctly in reference to the act itself, and to the *anomy* or transgression of the law, a course which, according to my judgment, is necessary and useful.

3. Lastly, with respect to the END and COMPLETION of sin, I attribute to Divine Providence either Punishment through severity, or Remission through grace; which are occupied about sin, in reference to its being sin and to its being *a transgression of the law*.

But I most solicitously avoid two causes of offense

- that God be not proposed as the author of sin,
- and that its liberty be not taken away from the human will.

These are two points which, if any one knows how to avoid, he will think upon no act which I will not in that case most gladly allow to be ascribed to the Providence of God, provided a just regard be had to the divine pre-eminence.

But I have given a most ample explanation of these my sentiments, in the Theses which were twice publicly disputed on the same subject in the University. On this account, therefore, I declare that I am much surprised, and not without good reason, at my being aspersed with this calumny, — *that I hold corrupt opinions respecting the Providence of God*. If it be allowable to indulge in conjecture, I think this slander had its origin in the fact of my denying that, *with respect to the decree of God, Adam necessarily sinned*, — an assertion which I yet constantly deny, and think it one that ought not to be tolerated, unless the word ‘necessarily’ be received in the acceptation of ‘*infallibly*,’ as it is by some persons; though this change does not agree with the etymology of the two words; for, necessity is an affection of being, but *infallibility* is an affection of the mind. Yet I easily endure the use of the first of these words, provided those two inconveniences to which I have recently alluded be faithfully avoided.

1.3 Divine predestination

With respect to the article of Predestination, my sentiments upon it are the following: It is an eternal and gracious decree of God in Christ, by which he determines to justify and adopt believers, and to endow them with life eternal, but to condemn unbelievers, and impenitent persons; as I have explained in the Theses on the same subject, which were publicly disputed, and in which, no one found any thing to be reprehended as false or unsound. Only it was the opinion of some persons that those Theses did not contain all the things which belong to this decree; nay, that the predestination about which there is the greatest controversy at this time, is not the subject of investigation in those Theses. This indeed I confess; for I considered it the best course to discuss that decree of predestination which is the foundation of Christianity, of our salvation, and of the assurance of salvation, and upon which the Apostle treats in the Eighth and Ninth chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, and in the First chapter of that to the Ephesians.

But such a decree as I have there described is not that by which God resolves to save some particular persons, and, that He may do this, resolves to endow them with faith, but to condemn others and not to endow them with faith. Yet many people declare, that this is the kind of predestination on which the apostle treats in the passages just cited. But I deny what they assert.

I grant that there is a certain eternal decree of God, according to which He administers the means necessary to faith and salvation, and this He does in such a manner as he knows to be suited to righteousness, that is, to his mercy and his severity. But about this decree, I think nothing more is necessary to be known, than that faith is the mere gift of the gracious mercy of God; and that unbelief is partly to be attributed to the fault and wickedness of men, and partly to the just vengeance of God, which deserts, blinds and hardens sinners.

But concerning that predestination by which God has decreed to save and to endow with faith some particular persons, but to damn others and not endow them with faith, so various are the sentiment, entertained even by the divines of our profession, that this very diversity of opinion easily declares the difficulty with which it is possible to determine any thing respecting it. For while some of them propose, as the object of predestination generally considered, that is, of election and reprobation, *man as a sinner and fallen in Adam*, others lay it down, *man considered as created and placed 'in puris naturalibus.'* Some of them consider this object to be, *man to be created*, or, as some of them express it, *man as salvable and damnable, as capable of being created and of falling.* Others of them lay down the object of election and reprobation, which they denominate NONELECTION and PRETERITION, *man considered in common and absolutely*; but they lay down the object of reprobation, on which they bestow the appellation of PREDAMNATION and AFFIRMATIVE REPROBATION, *man a sinner and guilty in Adam.* Lastly, some of them suppose that the object must be considered entirely in common, *man as yet to be created, as created, and as fallen.*

I am aware that when this diversity of opinion is offered as an objection, it is usual to reply that, in [*summa*] the substance of the matter there is complete agreement, although some difference exists in the circumstances. But it would be in my power to prove, that the preceding opinions differ greatly in many of the things which conduce to the very matter and substance of this kind of predestination; but that of consent or agreement there is nothing except in the minds of those who hold such sentiments, and who are prepared to bear with those who dissent from them as far as these points extend.

Such a mode of consent as this, [of which they are themselves the patrons], is of the highest necessity in the Christian Church, — as, without it, peace can by no means be preserved. I wish that I also was able to experience from them any such benevolent feelings towards me and my sentiments. In that species of predestination upon which I have treated, I define nothing that is not equally approved by all. On this point, alone, I differ, — I dare not with a safe conscience maintain in the affirmative any of the preceding opinions. I am also prepared to give a reason for this conscientious scruple when it shall be demanded by necessity, and can be done in a suitable manner.

1.4 Grace and free will

Concerning Grace and Free Will, this is what I teach according to the Scriptures and orthodox consent: Free Will is unable to begin or to perfect any true and spiritual good, without Grace. That I may not be said, like Pelagius, to practice delusion with regard to the word 'Grace,' I mean by it that which is the Grace of Christ and which belongs to regeneration. I affirm, therefore, that this grace is simply and absolutely necessary for the illumination of the mind, the due ordering of the affections, and the inclination of the will to that which is good. It is this grace which operates on the mind, the affections, and the will; which infuses good thoughts into the mind, inspires good desires into the actions, and bends the will to carry into execution good thoughts and good desires. This grace [*praevenit*] goes before, accompanies, and follows; it excites, assists, operates that we will, and co-operates lest we will in vain. It averts temptations, assists and grants succour in the midst of temptations, sustains man against the flesh, the world and Satan, and in this great contest grants to man the enjoyment of the victory. It raises up again those

who are conquered and have fallen, establishes and supplies them with new strength, and renders them more cautious. This grace commences salvation, promotes it, and perfects and consummates it.

I confess that the mind [*animalis*] of a natural and carnal man is obscure and dark, that his affections are corrupt and inordinate, that his will is stubborn and disobedient, and that the man himself is dead in sins. And I add to this — that teacher obtains my highest approbation who ascribes as much as possible to Divine Grace, provided he so pleads the cause of Grace, as not to inflict an injury on the Justice of God, and not to take away *the free will to that which is evil*.

I do not perceive what can be further required from me. Let it only be pointed out, and I will consent to give it, or I will shew that I ought not to give such an assent. Therefore, neither do I perceive with what justice I can be calumniated on this point, since I have explained these my sentiments, with sufficient plainness, in the Theses on Free Will which were publicly disputed in the University.

1.5 Justification

The last article is on Justification, about which these are my sentiments: Faith, and faith only, (though there is no faith alone without works), is imputed for righteousness. By this alone are we justified before God, absolved from our sins, and are accounted, pronounced and declared righteous by God, who delivers his judgment from the throne of grace.

I do not enter into the question be the active and the passive righteousness of Christ, or that of his death and of his life. On this subject, I walk at liberty: I say ‘Christ has been made of God to me righteousness’ — ‘he has been made sin for me, that through faith, I may be the righteousness of God in him.’

Nor yet do I refuse to confer with my brethren on this question, provided such conference be conducted without bitterness, and without an opinion of necessity, [that the partial view of any one should be generally received], from which scarcely any other result can ensue than the existence of distraction, and of increased effervescence in the minds of men, especially if this discussion should occur between those who are hot controversialists, and too vehement in their zeal.

But some persons charge me with this as a crime, — that I say the act itself of faith, that is, believing itself, is imputed for righteousness, and that in a proper sense, and not by a metonymy. I acknowledge this charge, as I have the apostle St Paul, in Romans iv, and in other passages, as my precursor in the use of this phrase. But the conclusion which they draw from this affirmation, namely, ‘that Christ and his righteousness are excluded from our justification, and that [*eam*] our justification is thus attributed to the worthiness of our faith,’ I by no means concede it to be possible for them to deduce from my sentiments.

For the word ‘*to impute*’ signifies that faith is not righteousness itself, but is graciously accounted for righteousness; by which circumstance all worthiness is taken away from faith, except that which is through the gracious [*dignatio*] condescending estimation of God. But this gracious condescension and estimation is not without Christ, but in reference to Christ, in Christ, and on account of Christ, whom God hath appointed as the propitiation through faith in his blood.

I affirm, therefore, that faith is imputed to us for righteousness, on account of Christ and

his righteousness. In this enunciation, faith is the object of imputation; but Christ and his obedience are the impetratory [procuring] or meritorious cause of justification. Christ and his obedience are the object of our faith, but not the object of justification or divine imputation, as if God imputes Christ and his righteousness to us for righteousness. This cannot possibly be, since the obedience of Christ is righteousness itself, taken according to the most severe rigor of the law. But I do not deny that the obedience of Christ is imputed to us; that is, that it is accounted or reckoned for us and for our benefit, because this very thing — that God reckons the righteousness of Christ to have been performed for us and for our benefit — is the cause why God imputes to us for righteousness our faith, which has Christ and his righteousness for its object and foundation, and why he justifies us by faith, from faith, or through faith.

If any one will point out an error in this my opinion, I will gladly own it, because it is possible for me to err, but I am not willing to be a heretic.

The preceding, then, as far as I remember, are the Articles which your Excellency mentioned to me, with my explanations of them produced from sincerity of mind; and as thus sincere, I wish them to be accounted by all who see them. This one favour I wish I could obtain from my brethren, who are associated with me in the Lord by the profession of the same religion, that they would at least believe me to have some feeling of conscience towards God. And this favour ought to be easily granted by them, through the Charity of Christ, if they be desirous to study his disposition and nature.

Of what service to me can a dissension be which is undertaken merely through a reckless humour of mind, or a schism created in the church of Christ, of which, by the grace of God and Christ, I profess myself to be a member? If my brethren suppose that I am incited to such an enterprise through ambition or avarice, I sincerely declare in the Lord, that they know me not. But I can confess that I am so free from the latter of these vices, as never to have been tickled, on any occasion, with even the most enticing of its snares — though it might be in my power to excuse or palliate it under some pretext or other. With regard to Ambition, I possess it not, except to that honourable kind which impels me to this service — to inquire with all earnestness in the Holy Scriptures for Divine Truth, and mildly and without contradiction to declare it when found, without prescribing it to any one, or labouring to extort consent, much less through a desire to ‘have dominion over the faith of others,’ but rather for the purpose of my winning some souls for Christ, that I may be a sweet savour to Him, and may obtain [*probum nomen*] an approved reputation in the church of the Saints. This good name I hope I shall obtain by the grace of Christ, after a long period of patient endurance; though I be now a reproach to my brethren, and ‘made as the filth of the world and the offscouring of all things’ to those who with me worship and invoke one God the Father, and one Lord Jesus Christ, in one spirit and with the same faith, and who have the same hope with me of obtaining the heavenly inheritance through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ.

I hope the Lord will grant unto me, that they and I may meekly meet together in his great name, and institute a Christian conference about those things which appertain to religion. O may the light of that sacred and happy day speedily shine upon me. In that assembly, I engage, through the grace of God, to manifest such moderation of mind, and such love for truth and peace, as ought deservedly to be required and expected from a servant of Christ Jesus.

In the mean time [till this assembly can be convened], let my brethren themselves remain

quiescent and suffer me to be quiet, that I may be at peace, and neither annoy them, nor create any uneasiness. If they entertain other thoughts concerning me, let them institute an [ecclesiastical] action against me; I will not shun or evade the authority of a competent judge, neither will I forfeit my recognizances by failing to appear.

If it be supposed that the minds of those who hear me are preoccupied in my favour, at a distance, by some politic subtlety which I display, and that the matter is so managed through cunning, as makes my brethren neither to consider it advisable to arraign me before the judges, nor to account it sufficiently safe to commit to my care the youthful students; and therefore, that the black stain which I have deserved ought to be affixed to my reputation, that my pupils and hearers may be frightened away; therefore, lest the result of this should be that the deferring of such a conference be productive of certain danger, behold I now offer myself, that I may, in company with them, address, solicit, and intreat those high personages who are invested with the power of issuing a summons for a convention of this kind, or of granting it, not to suffer us any longer to continue in this anguish and disquietude of mind, but either themselves to apply a speedy remedy, or allow it to be applied by others, but still by their order and under their direction.

I will not refuse to place myself before any assembly whatsoever,

- whether it be composed of all the ministers in our United Netherlands,
- or of some to be convoked from each of the seven provinces,
- or even of all the ministers of Holland and West Friesland, to which province our university at Leyden belongs,
- or of some ministers to be selected out of these,

provided the whole affair be transacted under the cognizance of our lawful Magistrates. Nor do I avoid or dread the presence of learned men, who may be invited from other countries, provided they be present at the conference on equitable conditions, and subject to the same laws as those under which I must be placed.

To express the whole matter at once: Let a convention be summoned, consisting of many members or of few, provided some bright hope of success be afforded [to them], a hope, I repeat it, which I shall be able, by sound arguments, to prove destitute of good foundation. Behold me, this day, nay, this very hour, prepared and ready to enter into it. For I am weary of being daily aspersed with the filthy scum of fresh calumnies, and grieved at being burdened with the necessity of clearing myself from them. In this part of my conduct, I am assuredly dissimilar from heretics, who have either avoided ecclesiastical assemblies, or have managed matters so as to be able to confide in the number of their retainers, and to expect a certain victory.

But I have finished. For I have occupied your attention, Most Honourable Sir, a sufficient length of time; and I have made a serious encroachment on those valuable moments which you would have devoted to matters of greater importance. Your Excellency will have the condescension to forgive the liberty which I have taken to address this letter to you, as it has been extorted from me by a degree of necessity; and not to disdain to afford me your patronage and protection, just so far as Divine Truth and the peace and concord of the Christian Church will allow you to vouchsafe.

I pray and beseech Almighty God long to preserve your Excellency in safety, to endue you yet more with the Spirit of wisdom and prudence, by which you may be enabled to

discharge the duties of the embassy which has been imposed upon you, and thus meet the wishes of the most illustrious Prince, the Elector Palatine. And, after you have happily discharged those duties, may he benignantlly and graciously grant to you a prosperous return to your own country and kindred.

Thus prays Your Excellency's most devoted servant,

JAMES ARMINIUS,

PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LEYDEN.

LEYDEN,
April 5, 1608

2 Certain articles to be diligently examined and weighed

BECAUSE SOME CONTROVERSY HAS ARISEN CONCERNING THEM AMONG EVEN THOSE
WHO PROFESS THE REFORMED RELIGION

These Articles are partly either denied or affirmed in a decisive Manner, and partly either denied or affirmed in a doubting Manner, each of which Methods signified by certain indicative Signs which are added to the different Articles.

2.1 On the Scripture and Human Traditions

1. The rule of Theological Verity is not two-fold, one *Primary* and the other *Secondary*; but it is one and simple, the Sacred Scriptures.
2. The Scriptures are the rule of all Divine Verity, from themselves, in themselves, and through themselves; and it is a rash assertion, ‘that they are indeed the rule, but only when understood according to the meaning of the Confession of the Dutch Churches, or when explained by the interpretation of the Heidelberg Catechism.’
3. No writing composed by men — by one man, by few men, or by many — (with the exception of the Holy Scriptures), is either *αξιόπιστον* ‘creditable of itself,’ or *αυτοπιστον* ‘of itself deserving of implicit credence,’ and, therefore, is not exempted from an examination to be instituted by means of the Scriptures.
4. It is a thoughtless assertion, ‘that the Confession and Catechism are called in question, when they are subjected to examination;’ for they have never been placed beyond the hazard of being called in doubt, nor can they be so placed.
5. It is tyrannical and Popish to bind the consciences of men by human writings, and to hinder them from being submitted to a legitimate examination, under what pretext soever such tyrannical conduct is adopted.

2.2 On God considered according to His nature

1. God is good by a natural and internal necessity, not *freely*; which last word is stupidly explained by the terms [*incoacte*] ‘unconstrainedly’ and ‘not slavishly.’
2. God foreknows future things through the infinity of his essence, and through the pre-eminent perfection of his understanding and prescience, not as he willed or decreed that they should necessarily be done, though he would not foreknow them except as they were future, and they would not be future unless God had decreed either to perform or to permit them.

2 Certain Articles Diligently Examined and Weighed

3. God loves righteousness and his creatures, yet he loves righteousness still more than the creatures, from which, two consequences follow:
4. The FIRST, that God does not hate his creature, except on account of sin.
5. The SECOND, that God absolutely loves no creature to life eternal, except when considered as righteous, either by legal or evangelical righteousness.
6. The will of God is both correctly and usefully distinguished into that which is *antecedent*, and that which is *consequent*.
7. The distinction of the will of God into that which is *secret* or *of his good pleasure*, and that which is *revealed* or *signified*, cannot bear a rigid examination.
8. Punitive justice and mercy neither are, nor can they be ‘the inly-moving’ or final causes of the first decree, or of its first operation.
9. God is blessed in himself and in the knowledge of his own perfection. He is, therefore, in want of nothing, neither does he require the demonstration of any of his properties by external operations: Yet if he do this, it is evident that he does it of His pure and free will; although, in this declaration [of any of His properties] a certain order must be observed according to the various egresses or ‘goings forth’ of his goodness, and according to the prescript of his wisdom and justice.

2.3 On God, considered according to the relation between the persons in the Trinity

1. The Son of God is not called by the Ancient Fathers ‘*God from himself*,’ and this is a dangerous expression. For, *Αυτοθεος* [as thus interpreted, *God from himself*], properly signifies that the Son has not the Divine Essence from another. But it is by a catachresis, or improperly, that the essence which the Son has is not from another; because the relation of the subject is thus changed: for ‘the Son,’ and ‘the Divine Essence,’ differ in relation.
2. The Divine Essence is communicated to the Son by the Father, and this properly and truly. Wherefore it is unskillfully asserted ‘that the Divine Essence is indeed *properly* said to be common to the Son and to the Father, but is *improperly* said to be communicated:’ For it is not common to both except in reference to its being communicated.
3. The Son of God is correctly called *Αυτοθεος* ‘very God,’ as this word is received for that which is God himself, truly God. But He is erroneously designated by that epithet, so far as it signifies that He has an essence not communicated by the Father, yet has one in common with the Father.
4. ‘The Son of God, in regard to his essence, is from himself,’ is an ambiguous expression, and, on that account, dangerous. Neither is the ambiguity removed by saying ‘The Son, with respect to his absolute essence, or to his essence absolutely considered, is from himself.’ Besides, these modes of speaking are not only novel, but are also mere prattle.

5. The Divine persons are not τροποι υπαρξεως or modes of being or of existing, or modes of the Divine Essence; For they are things with the mode of being or existing.
6. The Divine Persons are distinguished by a real distinction, not by the degree and mode of the thing.
7. A Person is an individual subsistence itself, not a characteristic property, nor is it an individual principle; though it be not an individual, nor a person, without a characteristic property or without an individual principle.
8. QUERIES. — Is it not useful that the Trinity be considered, both as it exists in nature itself, according to the co-essential relation of the Divine Persons, and as it has been manifested in the economy of salvation, to be accomplished by God the Father, in Christ, through the Holy Spirit? And does not the former of these considerations appertain to religion universally, and to that which was prescribed to Adam, according to the law? But the latter consideration properly belongs to the gospel of Jesus Christ, yet not excluding that which I have mentioned as belonging to all religion universally, and therefore to that which is Christian.

2.4 On the Decree of God

1. The decrees of God are the extrinsic acts of God, though they are internal, and, therefore, made by the free will of God, without any absolute necessity. Yet one decree seems to require the supposition of another, on account of a certain [*con-decentiam*] fitness of equity; as the decree concerning the creation of a rational creature, and the decree concerning the salvation or damnation [of that creature] on the condition of obedience or disobedience. The act of the creature also, when considered by God from eternity, may sometimes be the occasion, and sometimes the outwardly moving cause of making some decree; and this may be so far that without such act [of the creature] the decree neither would nor could be made.
2. QUERY. — Can the act of the creature impose a necessity on God of making some decree, and indeed [*talis*] a decree of a particular kind and no other — and this not only according to some act to be performed respecting the creature and his act, but also according to a certain mode by which that act must be accomplished?
3. One and the same in number is the volition by which God decrees something and determines to do or to permit it, and by which He does or permits the very thing which He decreed.
4. About an object which is one and the same, and uniformly considered, there cannot be two decrees of God, or two volitions, either in reality, or according to any [*speciem*] semblance of a contrary volition — as to will to save man under conditions, and yet to will precisely and absolutely to condemn him.
5. A decree of itself imposes no necessity on any thing or event. But if any necessity exists through the decree of God, it exists through the intervention of the Divine Power, and indeed when He judges it proper to employ his irresistible power to effect what He has decreed.

6. Therefore, it is not correctly said, 'The will of God is the necessity of things.'
7. Nor is this a just expression: 'All things happen necessarily with respect to the divine decree.'
8. As many distinct decrees are conceived by us, and must necessarily be conceived; as there are objects about which God is occupied in decreeing, or as there are axioms by which those decrees are enunciated.
9. Though all the decrees of God have been made from eternity, yet a certain order of priority and posteriority must be laid down, according to their nature, and the mutual relation between them.

2.5 On predestination to salvation, and on damnation considered in the highest degree

1. The first in order of the Divine Decrees is not that of Predestination, by which God foreordained to supernatural ends, and by which He resolved to save and to condemn, to declare his mercy and his punitive justice, and to illustrate the glory of his saving grace, and of his wisdom and power which correspond with that most free grace.
2. The *object* of predestination to supernatural ends, to salvation and death, to the demonstration of the mercy and punitive justice, or of the saving grace, the wisdom, and the most free power of God, is not rational creatures indefinitely foreknown, and capable of salvation, of damnation, of creation, of falling, and of reparation or of being recovered.
3. Nor is the *subject* some particular creatures from among those who are considered in this manner.
4. The difference between the vessels to honour and those to dishonour, that is, of mercy and wrath, does not appertain to the adorning or perfection of the universe or of the house of God.
5. The entrance of sin into the world does not appertain to the beauty of the universe.
6. Creation in the upright state of original righteousness is not a means for executing the decree of predestination, or of election, or of reprobation.
7. It is horrid to affirm, that 'the way of reprobation is creation in the upright state of original righteousness' (GOMARUS, in his *Theses on Predestination*) and in this very assertion are propounded two contrary volitions of God concerning one and the same thing.
8. It is a horrible affirmation, that 'God has predestinated whatsoever men he pleased not only to damnation, but likewise to the causes of damnation' (BEZA, vol. I, fol. 417).

9. It is a horrible affirmation, that ‘men are predestinated to eternal death by the naked will or choice of God, without any demerit [*proprium*] on their part’ (CALVIN, *Inst.* lib. I, cap. 2, 3).
10. This, also, is a horrible affirmation: ‘Some among men have been created unto life eternal, and others unto death eternal.’
11. It is not a felicitous expression, that ‘preparation unto destruction is not to be referred to any other thing, than to the secret counsel of God.’
12. Permission for the fall [of Adam] into sin, is not the means of executing the decree of predestination, or of election, or of reprobation.
13. It is an absurd assertion, that ‘the demerits of the reprobate are the subordinate means of bringing them onward to destined destruction.’
14. It is a false assertion, that ‘the efficient and sufficient cause and matter of predestination are thus found in those who are reprobated.’
15. The elect are not called ‘vessels of mercy’ in the relation of means to the end, but because mercy is the only moving cause, by which is made the decree itself of predestination to salvation.
16. No small injury is inflicted on Christ as Mediator, when he is called ‘the subordinate cause of destined salvation.’
17. The predestination of angels and of men differ so much from each other, that no property of God can be prefixed to both of them unless it be received in an ambiguous acceptation.

2.6 On the creation, and chiefly that of man

1. The creation of things out of nothing is the very first of all the external acts of God; nor is it possible for any act to be prior to this, or conceived to be prior to it; and the decree concerning creation is the first of all the decrees of God; because the properties according to which he performs and operates all things, are, in the first [*momento*] impulse of his nature, and in his first egress, occupied about nihility or nothing, when those properties are borne, *ad extra*, ‘outwards.’
2. God has formed two creatures rational and capable of things divine; ONE of them is purely spiritual and invisible, and [that is the class of] *Angels*; but the OTHER is partly corporeal and partly spiritual, visible and invisible, and [that is the class of] *Men*; and the perfection of this universe seeing to have required [*id*] the formation of these two [classes of] creatures.
3. QUERY. — Did it not become the manifold wisdom of God, and was it not suitable to the difference by which these two rational creatures were distinguished at the very creation, that, in the mode and [*ratione*] circumstances of imparting eternal life to angels and to men, He might act in a different manner with the former from that which He adopts towards the latter? It appears that He might do so.

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4. But two general methods may be mentally conceived by us, ONE of which is through the strict observance of the law laid down, without hope of pardon if any transgression were committed; but the OTHER is through the remission of sins, though a law agreeable to their nature was likewise to be prescribed by a peremptory decree to men, with whom it was not the will of God to treat in a strict manner and according to the utmost rigor; and obedience was to be required from them without a promise or pardon.
5. The image and likeness of God, after which man was created, belongs partly to the very nature of man, so that, without it, man cannot be man; but it partly consists in those things which concern supernatural, heavenly and spiritual things. The former class comprises the understanding, the affections, and the will, which is free; but the latter, the knowledge of God and of things divine, righteousness, true holiness, etc.
6. With respect to essence and adequate objects, the faith by which Adam believed in God is not the same as that by which he believed in God after the promise made concerning the Blessed Seed, and not the same as that by which we believe the Gospel of Christ.
7. Without [*laesionem*] doing any wrong to God, to Adam, and to the truth itself, it may be said, that in his primeval state Adam neither received or possessed a PROXIMATE [*potentiam*] capability of understanding, believing, or performing any thing whatsoever which could be necessary to be understood, believed, or performed by him, in any state whatsoever at which it was possible for him to arrive, either by his own [*facto*] endeavours or by the gift of God, though he must have had a remote capability, otherwise something essential would still have been to be created within man himself.
8. The liberty of the will consists in this — when all the requisites for willing or not willing are laid down, man is still indifferent to will or not to will, to will this rather than that. This indifference is removed by the previous determination, by which the will is circumscribed and absolutely determined to the one part or to the other of the contradiction or contrariety; and this predetermination, therefore, does not consist with the liberty of the will, which requires not only free capability, but also free use in the very exercise of it.
9. Internal necessity is as repugnant to liberty as external necessity is; nay, external necessity does not necessitate to act except by the intervention of that which is internal.
10. Adam either possessed, or had ready and prepared for him, sufficient grace, whether it were habitual or assisting, to obey the command imposed on him, both that command which was symbolical and ceremonial, and that which was moral.

2.7 On the Dominion of God over the creatures, and chiefly over man

1. The dominion of God over the creatures rests on the communication of the good which He has bestowed on them: And since this good is not infinite, neither is the dominion itself infinite. But that dominion is infinite according to which it may be lawful and proper for God to issue his commands to the creature, to impose on him all his works, to use him in all those things which his omnipotence might be able to command and to impose upon him, and to engage his services or attention.
2. Therefore the dominion of God does not extend itself so far as to be able to inflict eternal death on a rational creature, or to destine him to death eternal, without the demerits of the creature himself.
3. It is, therefore, falsely asserted, that ‘though God destined and created for destruction any creatures (indefinitely considered) without any consideration of sin as the meritorious cause, yet he cannot be accused of injustice, because he possesses an absolute right of dominion over them’ (GOMAR’s *Theses on Predestination*).
4. Another false assertion is this: ‘By the light of GLORY we shall understand by what right God can condemn [*immeritum*] an innocent person, or one who has not merited damnation, as by the light of GRACE we now understand by what right God saves [*immeritos*] unworthy and sinful men; yet this right we do not comprehend by the light of nature’ (LUTHER *On the Servitude of the Will*).
5. But still more false is the following assertion: ‘Man is bound to acquiesce in this will of God, nay, to give thanks to God, that He has made him an instrument of the Divine Glory, to be displayed through wrath and power in his eternal destruction.’
6. God can make of his own whatsoever He wills. But He does not will, neither can He will, to make of that which is his own whatever it is possible for him to make according to his infinite and absolute power.

2.8 On the Providence of God

1. The Providence of God is subordinate to creation; and it is, therefore, necessary that it should not impinge against creation, which it would do, were it to inhibit or hinder the use of free will in man, or should deny to man its necessary concurrence, or should direct man to another end, or to destruction, than to that which is agreeable to the condition and state in which he was created; that is, if the providence of God should so rule and govern man that he should necessarily become [*vitiosus*] corrupt, in order that God might manifest his own glory, both of justice and mercy, through the sin of man, according to his eternal counsel.
2. It appertains to the providence of God to act and permit; which two things are confounded when permission is changed into action under this pretext — that it cannot be idle or unemployed.

3. Divine providence does not determine a free will to one part of a contradiction or contrariety, that is, by a determination preceding the actual volition itself; [*alioquin*] under other circumstances the concurrence of the very volition with the will is the concomitant cause, and thus determines the will with the volition itself, by an act which is not previous but simultaneous, as the schoolmen express themselves.
4. The permission of God by which he permits any one to fall into sin is not correctly defined as ‘the subtraction or withdrawing of Divine Grace, by which, while God executes the decrees of his will through his rational creatures, He either does not unfold to the creature his own will by which He wills that wicked work to be done, or He does not bend the will of the man to obey the Divine Will in that action’ (URSINUS *On Providence*, tom. I, fol. 178).

2.9 On predestination, considered in the primeval state of man

1. It is not a true assertion, that ‘out of men considered *in puris naturalibus*, (either without supernatural things or with them), God has determined, by the decree of election, to elevate to supernatural felicity some particular men, but to leave others in nature.’
2. And it is rashly asserted that ‘it belongs to [*rationem*] the relation or analogy of the universe, that some men be placed on the right and others on the left, even as the method of the Master-builder requires, that some stones be placed on the left side, and others on the right, of a house which is to be built.’
3. The permission by which God permits that some men wander from and miss the supernatural end, is unwisely made subordinate to this predestination; for it appertains to Providence to lead and conduct a rational creature to supernatural felicity in a manner which is agreeable to the nature of that creature.
4. The permission, also, by which God permitted our first parents to fall into sin, is rashly said to be subordinate to this predestination.

2.10 On the cause of sin universally

1. Though sin can be committed by none except by a rational creature, and, therefore, ceases to be sin by this very circumstance if the cause of it be ascribed to God; yet it seems possible, by four arguments, to fasten this charge on our divines. ‘It follows from their doctrine *that God is the author of sin.*’
2. FIRST REASON. — Because they teach that, ‘without foresight of sin, God absolutely determined to declare his own glory through punitive justice and mercy, in the salvation of some men and in the damnation of others.’ Or, as others of them assert, ‘God resolved to illustrate his own glory by the demonstration of saving grace, wisdom, wrath, [*potentia et potestatis*] ability, and most free power, in the salvation of some particular men, and in the eternal damnation of others; which neither can be done, nor has been done, without the entrance of sin into the world.’

3. SECOND REASON. — Because they teach ‘that, in order to attain to that chief and supreme end, God ordained that man should sin and become corrupt, by which thing God might open a way to himself for the execution of this decree.’
4. THIRD REASON. — Because they teach ‘that God has either denied to man, or has withdrawn from man, before he sinned, grace necessary and sufficient to avoid sin;’ which is equivalent to this — as if God had imposed a law on man which was simply impossible to be performed or observed by his very nature.
5. FOURTH REASON. — Because they attribute to God some acts, partly external, partly mediate, and partly immediate, which, being once laid down, man was not able to do otherwise than commit sin by necessity of a consequent and antecedent to the thing itself, which entirely takes away all liberty; yet without this liberty a man cannot be considered, or reckoned, as being guilty of the commission of sin.
6. A FIFTH REASON. — Testimonies of the same description may be added in which our divines assert, in express words, that ‘the reprobate cannot escape the necessity of sinning, especially since this kind of necessity is injected through [*ordinatione*] the appointment of God’ (CALVIN’s *Institutes*, lib. 2, cap. 23).

2.11 Of the fall of Adam

1. Adam was able to continue in goodness and to refrain from sinning, and this in reality and in reference to the issue, and not only by [*potentia*] capability not to be brought into action on account of some preceding decree of God, or rather not possible to lead to an act by that preceding decree.
2. Adam sinned freely and voluntarily, without any necessity, either internal or external.
3. Adam did not fall through the decree of God, neither through being ordained to fall nor through desertion, but through the mere permission of God, which is placed in subordination to no predestination either to salvation or to death, but which belongs to providence so far as it is distinguished in opposition to predestination.
4. Adam did not fall necessarily, either with respect to a decree, appointment, desertion, or permission, from which it is evident what kind of judgment ought to be formed concerning expressions of the following description:
5. ‘I confess, indeed, that by the will of God all the sons of Adam have fallen into this miserable condition in which they are bound and fastened’ (CALVIN’s *Institutes*, lib. 3, cap. 23).
6. ‘They deny, in express words, the existence of this fact — that it was decreed by God that Adam should perish by his own defection.’
7. ‘God foreknew what result man would have, became he thus ordained it by his decree.’
8. ‘God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, but by his own will he [*dispensavit*] ordained it.’

2.12 On Original Sin

1. Original sin is not that actual sin by which Adam transgressed the law concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and on account of which we have all been constituted sinners, and rendered [*rei*] obnoxious or liable to death and condemnation.
2. QUERIES. — Is original sin only [*carentia*] the absence or want of original righteousness and of primeval holiness, with an inclination to commit sin, which likewise formerly existed in man, though it was not so vehement nor so inordinate as now it is, on account of the lost favour of God, his malediction, and the loss of that good by which that inclination was reduced to order? Or is it a certain infused habit (or acquired ingress) contrary to righteousness and holiness, after that sin had been committed,
3. Does original sin render men obnoxious to the wrath of God, when they have been previously constituted sinners on account of the actual sin of Adam, and rendered liable to damnation?
4. Adam, when considered in this state, after sin and prior to restoration, was not bound at once to punishment and obedience, but only to punishment.

2.13 On the predestination of man considered partly in his primeval state, and partly in the fall

1. It is rashly asserted that ‘the matter of predestination, as it is opposed to reprobation, is man in common or absolutely, if regard be had to *the foreordaining of the end*; but if regard be had to *the means for the end*, it is man about to perish by and in himself and guilty in Adam’ (TRELCAH *Institut.* lib. 2. *On Predestination*).
2. With equal infelicity is it asserted that ‘one reprobation is negative or passive, another affirmative or active; that the former is before all things and causes in things foreknown and considered, or that will arise from things; and that this act is respective of sin, and is called *predamnation*.’
3. It may become a subject of discussion in what manner the following things can be said agreeably to this doctrine: ‘The impulsive cause of this predestination is the benevolent [*affectus*] inclination of the will of God in Christ; and predestination is an eternal act of God, by which he resolves to make in Christ some creatures partakers of his grace and glory.’
4. This is a stupid assertion: ‘The just desertion of God, by which He does not confer grace on a reprobate man, and which appertains to predestination and to its execution, is that of exploration or trial.’ This also cannot be reconciled with the expressions in the preceding paragraph.

2.14 On predestination considered after the fall

1. QUERIES. — Out of the fallen human race, or out of the mass of corruption and perdition, has God absolutely chosen some particular men to life, and absolutely reprobated others to death, without any consideration of the good of the one or of the evil of the other? And from a just decree, which is both gracious and severe, is there such a requisite condition as this in the object which God is about to elect and to save, or to reprobate and condemn?
2. Is any man damned with death eternal, solely on account of the sin of Adam?
3. Are those who are thus *the elect* necessarily saved on account of the efficacy of grace, which has been destined to them only that they may not be able to do otherwise than assent to it, as it is irresistible,
4. Are those who are thus *the reprobate* necessarily damned, because either no grace at all, or not sufficient, has been destined to them, that they may assent to it and believe,
5. Or rather, according to St Augustine, Are those who are thus *the elect* assuredly saved, because God decreed to employ grace on them as he knew was suitable and congruous that they might be persuaded and saved; though if regard be had to the internal efficacy of grace, they may not be advanced or benefited by it,
6. Are those who have thus been *reprobated* certainly damned, because God does not apply to them grace as He knows to be suitable and congruous, though in the mean time they [*afficiantur*] are supplied with sufficient grace, that they may be able to yield their assent and be saved,

2.15 On the decrees of God which concern the salvation of sinful men, according to His own sense

1. The FIRST DECREE concerning the salvation of sinful men, as that by which God resolves to appoint his Son Jesus Christ as a Saviour, Mediator, Redeemer, High Priest, and One who may expiate sins, by the merit of his own obedience may recover lost salvation, and dispense it by his efficacy.
2. The SECOND DECREE is that by which God resolves to receive into [*gratiam*] favour those who repent and believe, and to save in Christ, on account of Christ, and through Christ, those who persevere, but to leave under sin and wrath those who are impenitent and unbelievers, and to condemn them as aliens from Christ.
3. The THIRD DECREE is that by which God resolves to administer such means for repentance and faith as are necessary, sufficient, and efficacious. And this administration is directed according to the wisdom of God, by which He knows what is suitable or becoming to mercy and severity; it is also according to his righteousness, by which He is prepared to follow and execute [the directions] of his wisdom.

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4. From these follows a FOURTH DECREE, concerning the salvation of *these* particular persons, and the damnation of *those*. This rests or depends on the prescience and foresight of God, by which he foreknew from all eternity [*quinam*] what men would, through such administration, believe by the aid of *preventing* or preceding grace, and would persevere by the aid of *subsequent* or following grace, and who would not believe and persevere.
5. Hence, God is said to ‘know those who are his;’ and the number both of those who are to be saved, and of those who are to be damned, is certain and fixed, and the *quod* and the *qui*, [the substance and the parties of whom it is composed], or, as the phrase of the schools is, both *materially* and *formally*.
6. The Second Decree [described in §II] is *predestination to salvation*, which is the foundation of Christianity, salvation, and of the assurance of salvation; it is also the matter of the Gospel, and [*summa*] the substance of the doctrine taught by the apostles.
7. But that predestination by which God is said to have decreed to save particular creatures and persons and to endue them with faith, is neither the foundation of Christianity, of salvation, nor of the assurance of salvation.

2.16 On Christ

1. QUERIES. — After the entrance of sin into the world, was there no other remedy for the expiation of sin, or of rendering satisfaction to God, than through the death of the Son of God,
2. Had the human nature in Christ any other thing, than substance alone, immediately from the LOGOS, that is, without the intervention of the Holy Spirit,
3. Have the holy conception of Christ through the Holy Ghost, and his birth from the Virgin Mary, [*horsum tendat*] this tendency — to cover the corruption of our nature lest it should come into the sight of God,
4. Does the holy life of Christ, in which he fulfilled all righteousness according to the prescript of the Moral Law concerning the love of God and of our neighbour, conduce only to this purpose — that Christ may be a pure and innocent High Priest and an uncontaminated victim, But was it not like-wise for this purpose — that this righteousness [of the holy life of Christ] may be our righteousness before God, and by this means performed by him for us, that is, in our name and in our stead,
5. Do those things which Christ suffered prior to his being placed before the tribunal of Pilate, concur with those which he afterwards endured, for the purging away and expiation of sins, and the redemption and reconciliation of sinners with God?
6. Was the oblation by which Christ offered himself to the Father as a victim for sin, so made on the cross that He has not offered himself and his blood to his Father in Heaven,

2.17 On the vocation of sinners to communion with Christ, and to a participation of his benefits

7. Is not the oblation by which Christ presents himself to his Father in heaven sprinkled with his own blood, a perpetual and continuous act, on which intercession rests or depends?
8. Is not the redemption which has been obtained by the blood of Christ, common to every man in particular, according to the love and affection of God by which he gave his Son for the world, though, according to the peremptory decree concerning the salvation of believers alone, it belongs only to some men?

2.17 On the vocation of sinners to communion with Christ, and to a participation of his benefits

1. Sinful man, after the perpetration of sin, has such a knowledge of the law as is sufficient for accusing, convicting, and condemning him; and this knowledge itself is capable of being employed by God when calling him to Christ, that he may, through it, compel man to repent and to flee to Christ.
2. An unregenerate man is capable of omitting more evil external works than he omits, and can perform more outward works which have been commanded by God than he actually performs; that is, it is possible for him to rule [*loco-motivam*] his inducements for abstaining in another and a better manner than that in which he does rule them; although if he were to do so, he would merit nothing by that deed.
3. The distribution of vocation into *internal* and *external*, is not the distribution of a genus into its species, or of a whole into its parts.
4. Internal vocation [*contingit*] is granted even to those who do not comply with the call.
5. All unregenerate persons have freedom of will, and a capability of resisting the Holy Spirit, of rejecting the proffered grace of God, of despising the counsel of God against themselves, of refusing to accept the Gospel of grace, and of not opening to Him who knocks at the door of the heart; and these things they can actually do, without any difference of *the Elect* and of *the Reprobate*.
6. Whomsoever God calls, He calls them seriously, with a will desirous of their repentance and salvation. Neither is there any volition of God about or concerning those whom He calls as being uniformly considered, that is, either affirmatively or negatively contrary to this will.
7. God is not bound to employ all the modes which are possible to Him for the salvation of all men. He has performed his [*officio*] part, when He has employed either one or more of these possible means for saving.
8. ‘That man should be rendered inexcusable,’ is neither the proximate end, nor that which was intended by God, to the Divine Vocation when it is first made and has not been repulsed.
9. The doctrine which is manifested only for the purpose of rendering those who hear it inexcusable, cannot render them inexcusable either by right or by efficacy.

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10. The right of God — by which he can require faith in Christ from those who do not possess the capability of believing in him, and on whom he refuses to bestow the grace which is necessary and sufficient for believing, without any demerit on account of grace repulsed — does not rest or depend on the fact that *God gave to Adam, in his primeval state, and in him to all men, the capability of believing in Christ.*
11. The right of God — by which he can condemn those who reject the gospel of grace, and by which he actually condemns the disobedient — does not rest or depend on this fact, that *all men have, by their own fault, lost the capability of believing which they received in Adam.*
12. Sufficient grace must necessarily be laid down; yet this sufficient grace, through the fault of him to whom [*contingit*] it is granted, does not [always] obtain its effect: [*Secus*] Were the fact otherwise, the justice of God could not be defended in his condemning those who do not believe.
13. The efficacy of saving grace is not consistent with that omnipotent act of God, by which He so inwardly acts in the heart and mind of man, that he on whom that act is impressed cannot do otherwise than consent to God who calls him; or, which is the same thing, grace is not an irresistible force.
14. QUERY. — Are *efficacious* and *sufficient* grace correctly distinguished according to a congruous or suitable vocation and one that is *incongruous*, so that it may be called *efficacious* grace, which God employs according to his purpose of absolutely saving some particular man, as he knows it to be congruous or suitable that this man should be moved and persuaded to obedience; and so that it may be called *sufficient* grace which he employs, not for such a purpose, though, from his general love towards all mankind, some are affected or moved by it, on whom, by a peremptory decree, he had resolved not to have mercy?
15. The *efficacy* which is distinguished from *efficiency* itself, seems not to differ at all from *sufficiency*.
16. Those who are obedient to the vocation or call of God, freely yield their assent to grace; yet they are previously excited, impelled, drawn and assisted by grace; and in the very moment in which they actually assent, they possess the capability of not assenting.
17. In the very commencement of his conversion, man conducts himself in a purely passive manner; that is, though, by a vital act, that is, [*sensu*] by feeling, he has a perception of the grace which calls him, yet he can do no other than receive it and feel it. But, when he feels grace affecting or inclining his mind and heart, he freely assents to it, so that he is able at the same time to withhold his assent.

2.18 On penitence

1. The doctrine concerning repentance is not legal but evangelical; that is, it appertains to the gospel and not to the law, although the law solicits and impels to repentance.

2. The knowledge or confession of sins, sorrow on account of sin and a desire for deliverance, with a resolution to avoid sin, are pleasing to God as [*initialia*] the very beginnings of conversion.
3. In propriety of speech, these things are not the mortification itself of the flesh or of sin but necessarily precede it.
4. Repentance is prior to faith in Christ; but it is posterior to that faith by which we believe that God is willing to receive into his favour the penitent sinner.
5. QUERIES. — Is the repentance of Judas properly called *legal*?
6. Was the penitence or repentance of the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon, of which Christ speaks in Matt. xi. 21, *dissembled* and feigned, or *true* repentance?

2.19 On faith

1. Justifying faith is not that by which any one believes that his sins are remitted to him for the sake of Christ; for [*illa*] the latter faith follows justification itself or remission of sins, which is the effect of justifying faith.
2. Justifying faith is not that by which any one believes himself to be elected.
3. All men are not bound to believe themselves to be elected.
4. The knowledge and faith by which any one knows and believes that [*credere*] he is in possession of faith, is prior by nature to that knowledge and faith by which any one knows and believes himself to be elected.
5. From these remarks, some judgment may be formed concerning that which is sometimes asserted, ‘A believing and elect person is bound to believe that he is elected.’
6. Justifying faith is that by which men believe in Jesus Christ, as in the saviour of those universally who believe, and of each of them in particular, even the Saviour of him who, through Christ, believes in God, who justifies the ungodly.
7. Evangelical and saving faith is of such vast excellency as to exceed the entire nature of man, and all his understanding, even that of Adam, when placed in a state of innocence.
8. God cannot of right require faith in Christ from that man whom, by an absolute will, he has reprobated, either without consideration of any sin, or as fallen in Adam; therefore, it was not his will that Christ should be of the least advantage to this man; or, rather, he willed that Christ should not profit him.
9. Faith is a gracious and gratuitous gift of God, bestowed according to the administration of the means necessary to conduce to the end, that is, according to such an administration as the justice of God requires, either towards the side of mercy or towards that of severity. It is a gift which is not bestowed according to an absolute will of saving some particular men; for it is a condition required in the object to be saved, and it is in fact a condition before it is the means for obtaining salvation.

10. Saving faith is that of the elect of God; it is not the faith of all men, of perverse and wicked men, not of those who repel the word of grace, and account themselves unworthy of life eternal, not of those who resist the Holy Spirit, not of those who reject the counsel of God against themselves, nor of those who have not been ordained to life eternal. No man believes in Christ except he has been previously disposed and prepared, by preventing or preceding grace, to receive life eternal on that condition on which God wills to bestow it, according to the following passage of Scripture: 'If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself' (John vii. 17).

2.20 On Regeneration and the Regenerate

1. The proximate subject of regeneration, which is effected in the present life by the Spirit of Christ, is the mind and the affections of man, or the will considered according to the mode of nature, not the will considered according to the mode of liberty. It is not the body of man, though man, when renewed by regeneration through his mind and feelings, actually wills in a good manner, and performs well through the instruments of the body.
2. Though regeneration is not perfected in a moment, but by certain steps and intervals; yet, as soon as ever it is perfected according to its essence, that is, through the renovation of the mind and affections, it renders the man spiritual, and capable of resisting sin through the assisting grace of God. Hence, also, from the Spirit, which predominates in him, he is called *spiritual* and not carnal, though he still has within him the flesh lusting against the Spirit. For these two, a carnal man and a spiritual man, are so denominated in opposition, and according to [that which is in each of them] the more powerful, prevailing or predominant party.
3. The regenerate are able to perform more true good, and of such as is pleasing to God, than they actually perform, and to omit more evil than they omit; and, therefore, if they do not perform and omit what they ought to do, that must not be ascribed to any decree of God or inefficacy of Divine Grace, but it must be attributed to the negligence of the regenerate themselves.
4. He who asserts that 'it is possible for the regenerate, through the grace of Christ, perfectly to fulfill the law in the present life,' is neither a Pelagian, nor inflicts any injury on the grace of God, nor establishes justification through works.
5. The regenerate are capable of committing sin designedly and in opposition to their consciences, and of so laying waste their consciences, through sin, as to hear nothing from them except the sentence of condemnation.
6. The regenerate are capable of grieving the Holy Spirit by their sins, so that, for a season, until they suffer themselves to be brought back to repentance, He does not exert his power and efficacy in them.
7. Some of the regenerate actually thus sin, thus lay waste their conscience, and thus grieve the Holy Spirit.

8. If David had died in the very moment in which he had sinned against Uriah by adultery and murder, he would have been condemned to death eternal.
9. God truly hates the sins of the regenerate and of the elect of God, and indeed so much the more, as those who thus sin have received more benefits from God, and a greater power of resisting sin.
10. There are distinctions by which a man is said to sin *with a full will, or with a will that is not full* — *fully* to destroy conscience, or *not fully* but *only partly*, and to sin *according to his unregenerate part*. When these distinctions are employed in the sense in which some persons use them, they are noxious to piety and injurious to good morals.

2.21 On the perseverance of saints

1. Queries. — Is it possible for true believers to fall away totally and finally?
2. Do some of them, in reality, totally and finally fall from the faith?
3. The opinion which DENIES ‘that true believers and regenerate persons are either capable of falling away or actually do fall away from the faith totally and finally,’ was never, from the very times of the apostles down to the present day, accounted by the church as a catholic doctrine. Neither has that which AFFIRMS the contrary ever been reckoned as a heretical opinion; nay, that which affirms it possible for believers to fall away from the faith, has always had more supporters in the church of Christ, than that which denies its possibility of its actually occurring.

2.22 On the assurance of salvation

1. QUERIES. — Is it possible for any believer, without a special revelation, to be certain or assured that he will not decline or fall away from the faith,
2. Are those who have faith, bound to believe that they will not decline from the faith?
3. The affirmative of either of these questions was never accounted in the church of Christ as a catholic doctrine; and the denial of either of them has never been adjudged by the Church Universal as a heresy.
4. The persuasion by which any believer assuredly persuades himself that it is impossible for him to decline from the faith, or that, at least, he will not decline from the faith, does not conduce so much to consolation against DESPAIR or against the doubting that is adverse to faith and hope, as it contributes to SECURITY, a thing directly opposed to that most salutary fear with which we are commanded to work out our salvation, and which is exceedingly necessary in this scene of temptations.
5. He who is of opinion that it is possible for him to decline from the faith, and who, therefore, is afraid lest he should decline, is neither destitute of necessary consolation, nor is he on this account, tormented with anxiety of mind. For it suffices to inspire consolation and to exclude anxiety, when he knows that he will

decline from the faith through no force of Satan, of sin, or of the world, and through no [*affectione*] inclination or weakness of his own flesh, unless he willingly and of his own accord, yield to temptation, and neglect to work out his salvation in a conscientious manner.

2.23 On the justification of man as a sinner, but yet a believer, before God

1. QUERIES. — was it possible for the Justice of God to be satisfied unless the Law were likewise satisfied,
2. Is the satisfaction which has been rendered in Christ to the Justice of God, the same as that rendered to the Law through Christ?
3. Do legal righteousness and that of the Gospel differ in essence? Or, Is the essence of both of them the same, that is, the *Matter* — the obedience performed to God, and the universal *Form* — the necessary conformity to the law?
4. Are there three parts of the righteousness of Christ by which believers are constituted righteous?
 - Is the *First* of them the HOLINESS of the nature of Christ, which is denominated *habitual righteousness*?
 - Is the *Second* those SUFFERINGS which, from infancy to the moment of his decease, he sustained on our account, and is this denominated his *passive obedience*, or that of his death?
 - Is the *Third* the most perfect, nay, the more than perfect FULFILLMENT of the moral law, (add also that of the ceremonial law), through the whole of his life to the period of his death; and is this denominated his *active obedience*, or that of his life?
5. Were not the acts of that obedience which Christ performed, and by which we are justified, imposed on Him according to the peculiar command of the Father, and according to a peculiar compact or covenant entered into between Him and the Father, in which He prescribed and stipulated those acts of obedience, with the addition of a promise that He should obtain eternal redemption for them, [the human race] and should see his seed, whom this obedience should justify through his knowledge, that is, through faith in Him?
6. To which of the offices of Christ do those acts of obedience belong?
7. Is the righteousness of Christ the righteousness of a believer or of an elect person, before God imputes it to him?
8. Does God impute this righteousness to him before he justifies him through faith?
9. Or, which is the same thing, Is the object about which God is occupied in the act of justification, an elect person, unrighteous indeed in himself but righteous in Christ his Head; so that He [*judicet*] accounts him righteous because he is already righteous

in Christ, that is, because the punishment due to him has been paid and endured by him in His Surety and Head, or because he has thus performed the obedience which was due from him?

10. Has an elect person really endured punishment in Christ and performed obedience, or only in the Divine estimation or reckoning? And is this Divine estimation, by which the elect person is reckoned to have endured punishment and performed obedience, an act preceding justification?
11. Does not the act of acceptation, by which God accepted the obedience of his Son, precede the oblation by which, through the Gospel, he offers his Son for righteousness,
12. Is the accepted imputation of the righteousness of Christ justification itself, or a preliminary to justification?
13. Is not the act of apprehension, by which faith apprehends Christ and his righteousness, or Christ for righteousness, prior to justification itself?
14. If this act [of apprehension] be prior to justification, how is faith the instrumental cause of our justification; that is, at once the instrumental cause of the apprehending which precedes justification, and of justification itself which succeeds this apprehending,
15. Or, Does not faith apprehend Christ offered for righteousness, before faith is imputed for righteousness?
16. In this enunciation, 'Faith is imputed to the believer for righteousness,' is the word 'Faith' to be *properly* received as the instrumental act by which Christ has been apprehended for righteousness? Or is it to be *improperly* received, that is, by a metonymy, for the very object which faith apprehends?
17. Is this phrase, 'Faith is received relatively and instrumentally,' the same as 'by the word FAITH is signified, through a metonymy, the very object of faith'?
18. Or, Is it the same thing to say 'We are justified by faith correlatively, and as it is an instrumental act, by which we apprehend Christ for righteousness' as we say 'We are justified by obedience or righteousness'?
19. May the righteousness of Christ be correctly said to be graciously imputed for righteousness, or to be graciously accounted for righteousness?
20. When the apostle expresses himself in this manner, 'Faith is imputed for righteousness,' must not this be understood concerning the imputation which is made, not according to debt, but according to grace?
21. May that of which we are made partakers through faith, or by faith, be called *the instrumental effect of faith*?
22. When God has decreed to justify no one through grace and mercy, except him who believes in Christ, and, therefore, through the preaching of the Gospel, requires

faith in Christ from him who desires to be justified, can it not be said ‘when God is graciously judging according to the Gospel, he is occupied about faith, as about a condition, which is required from, and performed by, him who appears before the throne of grace to be judged and justified’?

23. If this may be asserted, what crime is there in saying ‘through the gratuitous and gracious acceptance [of God] is faith accounted for righteousness on account of the obedience of Christ’?
24. Is ‘If the work of men who are born again were perfect, they might be justified by them, though they may have perpetrated many evil works when [or before] they obtain the remission of them’ a correct assertion?

2.24 On the Good Works of Believers

1. QUERIES. — Is it truly said, concerning the good works of believers ‘they are unclean like a menstruous cloth’, And does this confession, ‘We are all as an unclean thing, and all our righteousness are as filthy rags,’ etc. (Isa. lxiv. 6), belong to those works?
2. In what sense is it correctly said ‘Believers sin mortally in every one of their good works’?
3. Do the good works of believers come into the judgment of God so far only as they are testimonies of faith; or like- wise so far as they have been prescribed by God, and sanctioned and honoured with the promise of a reward, although this reward be not bestowed on them except ‘of grace’ united with mercy, and on account of Christ, whom God hath appointed and set forth as a propitiation through faith in his blood, and, therefore, with [*intuitu*] reference to faith in Christ?

2.25 On prayer

1. QUERIES. — Does prayer, or the invocation of God, hold relation only to the performance of worship to his honour? Or, does it likewise bear the relation of means necessary for obtaining that which is asked — means, indeed, which God foresaw would be employed before he absolutely determined to bestow the blessing on the petitioner,
2. Is the faith with which we ought to pray, that faith by which he who prays believes assuredly that he will obtain what he asks? Or is it that faith by which he is assuredly persuaded, that he is asking according to the will of God, and will obtain what he asks, provided God knows that it will conduce to his glory and to the salvation of the petitioner?

2.26 On the infants of believers when they are offered for baptism

QUERY. — When the children of believers are offered for baptism, are they considered as ‘the children of wrath,’ or as the children of God and of grace? And if they be considered

in both ways, is this relation according to the same time, or according to different times?

2.27 On the Supper of the Lord

QUERY. — Is not the proximate and most appropriate, and, therefore, the immediate end of the Lord's Supper, both as it was at first instituted and as it is now used, the memory, or commemoration, or annunciation of the Lord's death, and this with thanksgiving for the gift of God, in delivering up his Son to death for us, and in having given his flesh to be eaten and his blood to be drank through faith in him?

2.28 On Magistracy

1. The chief magistrate is not correctly denominated *Political* or *Secular*, because those epithets are opposed to the ecclesiastical and spiritual power.
2. In the hands and at the disposal of the chief magistrate is placed, under God, the supreme and sovereign power of caring and providing for his subjects, and of governing them, with respect to animal and spiritual life.
3. The care of religion has been committed by God to the chief magistrate, more than to priests and to ecclesiastical persons.
4. It is in the power of the magistrate to enact laws concerning civil and ecclesiastical polity, yet not unless those persons have been asked and consulted who are the best versed in spiritual matters, and who are peculiarly designed for teaching the church.
5. It is the duty of the magistrate
 - to preserve and defend the ecclesiastical ministry
 - to appoint the ministers of God's word, after they have previously undergone a lawful examination before a Presbytery
 - to take care that they perform their duty
 - to require an account of their ministry
 - to admonish and incite those among them who are negligent
 - to bestow rewards on those ministers who preside well over their flocks, and
 - to remove such as are pertinaciously negligent, or who bring a scandal on the church.
6. Also to invoke councils, whether general, national or provincial; by his own authority to preside as moderator of the assembly, either in person or through deputies suitable for discharging such an office.
7. QUERY — Is it useful to ecclesiastical conventions or assemblies, that those persons preside over them whose interest it is that matters of religion and church discipline should be transacted in this manner rather than in that?

2 *Certain Articles Diligently Examined and Weighed*

8. For the discharge of these duties, the magistrate must understand those mysteries of religion which are absolutely necessary for the salvation of men; for in this part [of his high office] he cannot depend upon and confide in the conscience of another person.
9. The Christian magistrate both presides in those ecclesiastical assemblies in which he is present, and pronounces a decisive and definitive sentence, or has the right of delivering a decisive and definitive sentence.

2.29 On the church of Rome

1. QUERIES. — Must a difference be made between the *Court of Rome*, (that is, the Roman Pontiff, the Cardinals, and the other sworn retainers and satellites of his kingdom), and the *Church* which is denominated *Romish*?
2. Can those persons by no means be called ‘the church of Christ,’ who, having been deceived by the Roman Pontiff consider him as the successor of St Peter and the head of the church?
3. Has God sent a bill of divorcement to those persons, so that he does not at all acknowledge them as his, any more than he does Mahometans and Jews?